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 The Limits of Victorian Federalism: 
 E. A. Freeman’s History of Federal Government 
 For Europeans in the 1860s, federalism was a familiar idea. Federa-
tions had been proposed as possible solutions for both Italian and Ger-
man unification. In 1858, at Plombières, Louis Napoleon had suggested 
reorganizing Italy as a federation of four princely states with the pope at 
its head. A Germanic Confederation had existed ever since the Con-
gress of Vienna, and after the Austrian War in 1866, Bismarck estab-
lished a North German Confederation under the presidency of Prussia. 
Federations might play a role in other parts of the continent as well. 
After the Crimean War, for instance, a federation of Balkan states 
seemed to offer an alternative to Ottoman dominion in southeastern 
Europe. But federal governments were not without their problems. 
Across the Atlantic, the American Civil War was testing the resilience of 
the world’s largest federation, and for a moment at least this conflict 
called into question the whole federalist enterprise. 
 English writers found the federal idea attractive in large part be-
cause it seemed to provide a solution to the problems posed by Europe’s 
emerging nationalities. John Stuart Mill, in his Considerations on Repre-
sentative Government (1861), raised the issue in exactly this context. 
According to Mill, federations were most suitable in those regions 
where a number of small states possessed similar interests based on 
common language, religion, ethnicity and political institutions, but 
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where traditions of independence prevented them from uniting in a 
single consolidated state. Thus for Mill federations facilitated nation-
building, the process whereby small states sharing a common nationali-
ty were amalgamated into larger entities. The advantage of a federation, 
Mill went on, was that it would protect the member states from hostile 
neighbors, particularly when those neighbors were “feudal monarchs” 
who resented the liberal institutions that generally characterized federal 
governments. Here the image of a federally united Italy facing an auto-
cratic Austria came most readily to mind. Indeed, Mill wondered 
whether a unified Italy might not be a perfect candidate for federal or-
ganization, though by the time Representative Government came out the 
creation of a consolidated Italian monarchy had all but answered the 
question.  1
 Mill’s ideas were symptomatic of the age as other writers were 
drawn to federalism for similar reasons.  In 1863, Edward Augustus 2
Freeman published the first volume of his History of Federal Govern-
ment, a study of ancient Greek federalism under the Achaean League.  3
Though unknown today, Freeman was undoubtedly the most enthusias-
tic advocate of the federal idea that Victorian England produced. He is 
best considered a liberal nationalist who was drawn to federalism in 
large part because it spoke to the problems posed by continental na-
tionalism.  He regarded nationality as a linguistic and racial category, 4
and he anticipated the day when large states, each representing the will 
of a single sovereign nation, would define the European state system. 
He endorsed nationalist movements in Italy, Germany and the Balkans, 
and opposed the Austrian and Ottoman empires on the grounds that 
they violated the principles of nationality and popular sovereignty. To 
help build these new nation-sates, Freeman pointed to federalism, argu-
ing that federations would enable populations of similar nationality to 
achieve independence, cohesion and security, while at the same time 
establishing liberal governments in which decentralization would curb 
the exercise of power. 
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1 
 Freeman’s History of Federal Government was the first—and, as it 
turned out, the only— installment of a much larger work. His original 
intention was to write four volumes. Ancient Greek federalism under 
the Achaean League, the Swiss Confederation from the thirteenth cen-
tury to the present day, the United Provinces from their independence 
to the French Revolution, and the development of federal government 
in the United States were to have a volume each. But in the event, 
Freeman wrote only the first. Though it was never completed as origi-
nally intended, the History of Federal Government was still a substantial 
work, combining an introductory chapter on federalism in general with 
a lengthy discussion of the Achaean League and other Greek attempts at 
federation. In 1893, J. B. Bury oversaw a new edition of the book, 
adding to the original text a few fragments found among Freeman’s pa-
pers. 
 Freeman’s federalism—the way he defined it and the advantages he 
attached to it—spoke directly to contemporary European problems. 
Indeed, the numerous references to current events that peppered the 
History of Federal Government made it clear that present-day concerns 
were never far from his mind as he wrote the book. The American Civil 
War alone, he thought, had made the “origin” and “destiny” of federal-
ism “the most interesting of all political problems.”  But more than 5
America, it was Europe he was contemplating: for in essence, federalism 
was Freeman’s response to the rise of nationalism, especially in Italy and 
the Balkans, the two areas of Europe most pressingly in need of redefin-
ition. It was not accidental that Freeman began to write his History of 
Federal Government during the Crimean War, a conflict that placed the 
future of the Italian and the Balkan nations before the public. Federa-
tions, he suggested, would organize these emerging nationalities into 
viable political units, establish peace and stability in two troubled re-
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gions, guarantee political and intellectual progress, and promote the 
cause of freedom. As a rule, the Victorians favored large political units 
and Freeman was no exception. Only states of considerable size, they 
believed, would have the resources to support viable economies, provide 
for defense and play a stabilizing role in the balance of power. Most 
Victorian liberals, therefore, saw nationalism as a force leading to the 
creation of large nation-states, whether in Germany, Italy or the Balka-
ns. The problem confronting these liberal nationalists was how to over-
come the strong divisions that stood in the way of consolidation, and 
federalism seemed to provide the answer because of its respect for local 
customs and allegiances.  
 In presenting federal ideas in a favorable light, Freeman was pursu-
ing goals that were actually more conventional and limited than might 
at first appear. He accepted the European state system as it functioned 
in his own day:  an arrangement of sovereign states, each independent, 
recognizing no higher authority and existing in competition with one 
another. He did not regard federalism as an alternative to this system, as 
some kind of supranational organization regulating relations between 
states and thus calling on its members to surrender a degree of their 
autonomy.  He was not, in other words, a visionary dreaming of a fed6 -
erally united Europe. By the turn of the century, some English federal-
ists would begin to think in these terms, but Freeman clearly did not. 
As a mid-Victorian liberal, he thought within prevailing assumptions 
and saw no need to replace the existing system with something new. 
Indeed, for him federalism was a way to make this system work more 
smoothly by reconstructing the messy parts of Europe—Italy, Germany, 
the Balkans, the Habsburg lands—on the basis of large, stable states. 
Nor did Freeman regard federalism as a solution to the constitutional 
problems that arose in Britain in the 1880s and 1890s over Irish home 
rule and imperial federation.  Having derived his federalist principles 7
from a continental context, he was reluctant to apply them to Britain. 
Because he saw federation as a means to build or preserve large states, 
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he considered it applicable to those areas where large states did not ex-
ist. But such was not the case with Britain. To create a federal Britain by 
sharing sovereignty with Ireland or the colonies would only reverse the 
process of nation-building and weaken an already strong unitary state. 
 Freeman began his History with a definition: “A Federal Common-
wealth,” he wrote, “…in its perfect form, is one which forms a single 
state in its relations to other nations, but which consists of many states 
with regard to its internal government.”  Such an arrangement, he con8 -
tinued, usually arose when a number of smaller states united together 
and delegated authority to a central government, which then presided 
over their combined affairs. In joining a federation, however, member 
states did not relinquish all their former independence, but rather re-
tained absolute sovereignty over their own internal affairs: they could 
determine their own laws and the forms of their own constitutions. In a 
similar manner, the central government, while not permitted to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of the member states, was absolutely sovereign 
in those matters affecting the entire federation, especially its relation-
ship with the outside world. “The making of peace and war, the sending 
and receiving of ambassadors,” Freeman wrote, “generally all that comes 
within the department of International Law, will be reserved wholly to 
the central power. Indeed, the very existence of the several members of 
the Union will be diplomatically unknown to foreign nations, which 
will never be called upon to deal with any power except the Central 
Government.”  9
 In an effort to categorize this composite type of government, Free-
man rejected the normal classification of monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy. A federal government, he pointed out, could actually fall 
into any one of these classes since a union of democracies, aristocracies, 
or even monarchies was each theoretically possible. Instead of using 
these conventional categories, Freeman proposed to divide governments 
by size into small or large states, a taxonomy that he believed would 
  Freeman and Victorian Federalism 6
reveal the particular advantage of a federal system. As he explained: “A 
Federal Government is most likely to be formed when the question 
arises whether several small states shall remain perfectly independent, or 
shall be consolidated into a single great state. A Federal tie harmonizes 
the two contending principles by reconciling a certain amount of union 
with a certain amount of independence. A Federal Government then is 
a mean between the system of large states and the system of small 
states.”  These small and large states, for Freeman, were also historically 10
specific. The small state, which must be small enough for all its citizens 
to gather in one place for political purposes, had reached perfection in 
the independent cities of ancient Greece. The large state, which must be 
so large that the distances between citizens made such direct participa-
tion in politics impossible, had achieved perfection in the monarchies 
of modern Europe.  A federal state was then a compromise between 11
past and present: because it permitted small states to retain much of 
their independence while grouping them in larger political units, it 
would at its best combine the political freedom of the Greek city with 
the stability of the large European monarchy. 
 The greatest advantage of the small state was its ability to educate 
its citizens. By encouraging them to participate in politics, the ancient 
Greek city gave its residents an unprecedented opportunity to learn the 
skills and responsibilities of governing. A small state like Athens, Free-
man declared with Victorian confidence, provided all its citizens with 
the kind of political education that the contemporary House of Com-
mons gave to its several hundred members.  The result was a people of 12
the highest political sophistication. Praising in this way the participato-
ry politics of the ancient city state, Freeman came forward as an enthu-
siast for Athenian democracy. No other political system “made a greater 
number of citizens fit to use power…,” he maintained: “…The Athen-
ian citizen, by constantly hearing questions of foreign policy and do-
mestic administration freely argued by the greatest orators that the 
world ever saw, received a political education which nothing else in the 
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history of mankind has ever been found to equal.” Only in a city like 
Athens, he concluded, would “the average of political knowledge, and 
indeed of general intelligence of every kind, be so high….”  But the 13
small state had its drawbacks as well. The restricted size of the political 
field tended to intensify rivalries and create lasting political divisions. 
The absence of any overarching authority to which neighboring states 
could appeal for justice made it all but inevitable that disputes between 
them would be settled through war. Vicious internal strife and chronic 
warfare ensured that the life of the small state would be short and its 
history would be one of disorder and turmoil.  14
 Providing peace and stability, however, was exactly what Freeman 
thought the large modern kingdom did best. A central government, 
presiding over numerous cities and treating each of its subjects impar-
tially, would ensure that local disagreements were settled peacefully, 
thereby avoiding the constant warfare that had plagued the ancient city 
states.   When wars did break out between large states, they would also 15
tend to be less disruptive and less costly than the wars between either 
ancient or modern cities. “A happily situated … nation may wage war 
after war, and spend nothing except its treasures and the blood of the 
soldiers actually engaged,” Freeman wrote with the optimism of one 
who had not yet experienced twentieth-century war: “The wars which 
we can ourselves remember, the Russian War of 1854–6 and the Lom-
bard campaign of 1859, have been mere child’s play compared to the 
great internal wars either of Greece or of Germany. The scale of the 
powers engaged of course caused a tremendous loss of life among actual 
combatants, but the general amount of misery inflicted on the world 
was trifling in proportion to what was caused either by the Pelopon-
nesian War or by the War of Thirty Years.”  But large modern king16 -
doms paid a price for this peace and stability. More orderly than the 
ancient Greek cities, they were less able to engage their citizens politi-
cally, even when they were constitutional monarchies. Because of their 
size, these large states were inevitably governed by representative assem-
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blies, a practice which limited the involvement of most citizens to the 
election of those who would represent them. Such a system, Freeman 
argued, removed the average citizen from the political process and con-
tributed to his political debasement. Electors were often “ignorant and 
careless of public affairs.” They often cast their votes “blindly, recklessly, 
and corruptly.” Some did not even bother to vote, while others sold 
their votes. “Ignorance, carelessness, and corruption”—these, Freeman 
concluded, were the shortcomings of large-scale representative govern-
ment.  17
 Forced to choose between the vital but turbulent politics of the city 
state and the orderly but disengaged politics of the large monarchy, 
Freeman knew where his preference lay. The Greek city, he readily ad-
mitted, was a thing of the past and could not be recalled. The large 
monarchy, with its representative institutions, was the great Teutonic 
contribution to politics and it had brought a well needed stability to 
much of Europe. But the beauty of the federation, which combined the 
best of both the small and large state, was that one did not have to 
choose. A federal government, Freeman argued, would guarantee stabil-
ity almost as effectively as a monarchy because, like the monarchy, it 
had the power to adjudicate peacefully any disputes that arose among 
its constituents.  A federal government would educate its citizens al18 -
most as effectively as a city state because the principle of decentraliza-
tion, which defined the federation, would foster a genuine respect for 
traditions of local self-government—and, for Freeman, nothing was 
more likely to improve citizens politically than the experience of gov-
erning themselves. In a federation, he wrote, “republican habits and 
feelings will cause appeals to the people to be far more common and far 
more direct than is usual in a monarchic state. Political meetings and 
regularly organized Conventions will be far more common and far 
more influential.” Above all, the principal that each member state 
should manage its own affairs without interference from above would 
naturally ensure that these states grant a large amount of municipal lib-
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erty to their own counties, cities and towns. “In the New England 
States,” Freeman noted, “where the true Federal model is best carried 
out, local Self-Government seems to have reached its fullest develop-
ment.” There, amid the excitement of the New England town meeting, 
citizens received a kind of political education that was unavailable in 
the centralized monarchies of contemporary Europe.  19
 Freeman’s History of Federal Government was the most sophisticated 
treatment of its subject to appear in England during the nineteenth 
century and it revealed the parameters that shaped most Victorian 
thinking about federalism.  For Freeman, as for Mill and others, feder20 -
ation was a process of building nations, not of breaking them apart, and 
it was applicable therefore only to those areas where large states were 
lacking. The goal of federation was to achieve international stability 
within the existing state system and domestic freedom based on local 
self-government. As Freeman’s comments on war made clear, he did not 
envision a world free of conflict, but rather a system of independent 
states where the disruption, frequency and cost of war was lessened be-
cause the states involved were large. As his comments on New England 
made clear, he approved of federal government because it encouraged a 
decentralized but orderly democracy. Such was Freeman’s understanding 
of federalism, and his discussion of it placed him in the forefront of 
progressive thinking in England. In his Considerations on Representative 
Government, Mill had evaluated government on the same grounds as 
Freeman. For Mill, as for Freeman, the purpose of government was to 
foster “virtue and intelligence” among the governed and ancient Athens 
was the one place where this had been done most effectively. The expe-
rience of Athenian democracy, Mill wrote, anticipating Freeman, 
“raised the intellectual standard of an average Athenian citizen far be-
yond anything of which there is yet an example in any other mass of 
men, ancient or modern. The proofs of this are apparent in every page 
of our great historian of Greece....” The reference to George Grote’s His-
tory of Greece (1846–1856) is instructive: for by the mid-nineteenth 
  Freeman and Victorian Federalism 10
century, ancient Athens had become a litmus test for attitudes to 
democracy, and Grote’s vindication of Athenian democracy, which 
Freeman and Mill both praised, was one of the great works of Victorian 
radicalism.  21
2 
 Freeman chose to illustrate the advantages of federalism for nation-
building by turning to antiquity and writing a history of the Achaean 
League, a confederation of Greek cities whose leader, Aratus, united the 
Greeks and drove the Macedonians from the Peloponnese. That Free-
man should have looked to ancient Greece was not surprising. The Vic-
torians, after all, were immersed in the classical past. But they did not 
consider all periods equal, preferring the Athens of Plato and Thucy-
dides to the later periods. Freeman, however, saw things differently. He 
was drawn to later Greek history precisely because of its modernity: “…
it is the history of a complex political world, in which single cities, 
monarchies, and Federations, all play their part, just as they do in the 
European history of later times.”  As Freeman told the story of the 22
Achaean League, he drew an explicit parallel between past and present: 
the League’s rise was nothing less than a “national struggle of Greece 
against Macedonia” that resembled the campaigns for Italian unifica-
tion, which he considered “the most glorious event of our own day.”  23
Macedonia was a foreign power holding the Greeks in subjection, much 
as Austria had dominated Italy, and the League stood for unification. 
The lessons of ancient Greece were many. Athens gave the world phi-
losophy, art, poetry. The Achaean League gave the world a different les-
son: how to unite, throw off the oppressor, and achieve national free-
dom. “For a hundred and forty years,” Freeman concluded, “…the 
League had given to a larger portion of Greece than any previous age 
had seen, a measure of freedom, unity, and general good government, 
which may well atone for the lack of the dazzling glory of the old 
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Athenian Democracy. It was no slight achievement to weld together so 
many cities into an Union which strengthened them against foreign 
Kings and Senates, and which yet preserved to them that internal inde-
pendence which was so dear to the Hellenic mind.”  24
 If, as Freeman wanted us to believe, the Achaean League fought the 
war of Greek independence, then Aratus was its Cavour: he was “devot-
ed to the cause of freedom,” to extending “the area of free Greece,” and 
the League under his leadership became “a great Pan-hellenic power, the 
centre of Grecian freedom, the foe of Tyrants and the refuge of the op-
pressed.”  But if Aratus achieved independence and unity, he did so at 25
a cost. Sparta stood in the way of Greek unification. Just as Cavour 
would cede Nice and Savoy to France in order to secure Louis 
Napoleon’s support in the campaign against Austria, so Aratus restored 
Corinth to Macedonia as the price of Macedonian aid in the war 
against Sparta. Freeman drew out the parallel between the two rulers:  
There is indeed much likeness in the character and career of the 
two men; each sought the noblest of ends, but neither was so 
scrupulous as strict morality could wish as to the means by which 
those ends were to be compassed. Each was, in his own age, unri-
valled for parliamentary and diplomatic skill; each indulged in the 
same dark and crooked policy…. But the cession of Akrokorinthos 
was a deeper sin against freedom than the cession of Savoy and 
Nizza. Both the Achaian and the Italian statesman surrendered a 
portion of the land which he had saved into the hands of a foreign 
despot; one surrendered his own ancestral province, the other sur-
rendered the scene of his own most glorious exploit. Each deed was 
equally the betrayal of a trust, the narrowing of the area of 
freedom.  26
So the parallel was imperfect—Freeman preferred Cavour to Aratus, 
finding Cavour’s crime less odious—but that was hardly the point. As 
an example of political rhetoric, Freeman’s juxtaposition of past and 
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present, of Aratus and Cavour, served to establish ancient Greek feder-
alism and the Achaean League as a paradigm for modern nation-build-
ing. 
 Freeman intended his work as a piece of scholarship and in all fair-
ness we ought to evaluate it as a contribution to classical historiography, 
not as a tract for the times. But scattered among the mind-numbing 
details that made up his description of the Achaean constitution were 
observations suggesting that he intended his work to speak to contem-
porary events. For example, his description of the League’s constitution 
emphasized its modern and liberal attributes, rendering it a suitable 
model for nineteenth-century nation-building. It was “strictly Federal” 
according to his definition: each city was independent regarding its in-
ternal affairs, a federal government determined relations with other 
states, and both city and federal governments were “democratic.”  27
Freeman’s frequent comparisons of the Achaean and British constitu-
tions, combined with his use of Victorian terminology, only reinforced 
the present-mindedness of his analysis. The Achaean federal assembly, 
he maintained, resembled the House of Commons, its magistrates acted 
as “Ministers” comprising a “Cabinet,” and there was a “Government” 
and an “Opposition.”  His conclusion only perpetuated the confusion 28
of past and present: “Altogether the general practical working of the 
Achaian system was a remarkable advance in the direction of modern 
constitutional government. And it especially resembles our own system 
in leaving to usage, to the discretion of particular persons and Assem-
blies, and to the natural working of circumstances, much which nations 
of a more theoretical turn of mind might have sought to rule by posi-
tive law.”  Freeman’s ancient Greeks were Burkeans, eschewing abstract 29
design and allowing precedence and circumstances to direct change, 
and their respect for constitutional procedures was English at heart. 
 Having asserted the suitability of the Achaean League as a model 
for contemporary nation-building, Freeman applied it to those areas in 
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Europe where nationalism was forcing change: Italy, Greece, and the 
Balkans generally. Like so many English liberals, Freeman had been a 
longtime advocate of Italian nationality. As we have seen, Cavour as-
sumed heroic proportions in his Federal Government as the statesman 
who unified Italy by liberating it from Austrian domination. But Italy 
in fact troubled Freeman because events there had not gone quite as he 
thought they should. He had always hoped that Italian unification 
would result in a federation rather than in a single consolidated monar-
chy. The conditions for federal government were all present: “The his-
toric greatness of her cities, the wide diversities among her several prov-
inces, the difference in feelings, manners, and even language, between 
Sicily, Rome, Tuscany, Venice, and Piedmont, all pointed to a Federal 
Union as the natural form for Italian freedom to assume. It seemed, on 
every ground, to be the form of unity under which Italy might look for 
the highest amount of internal prosperity and contentment.”  But the 30
Italians had decided otherwise, and with the establishment of the King-
dom of Italy all prospects for an Italian federation had vanished. 
 Freeman’s approach to Italy demonstrated the limitations of his 
historical rhetoric. By associating Aratus with Cavour, he had hoped to 
establish Achaean federalism as a viable model for nation-building. But 
this rhetorical strategy contained a flaw. The juxtaposition of Cavour 
and Aratus, rather than legitimating the Achaeans, could just as easily 
serve to discredit Cavour’s achievement. Whereas Aratus had gathered 
the Greek cities into a federation, Cavour delivered the Italian states to 
Victor Emanuel in the form of a consolidated monarchy. Cavour, it 
turned out, was not the kind of nation-builder that Freeman thought 
he was, and Italian unification had not followed the course that Free-
man had marked out for it. In 1857, he had warned that Italian unifica-
tion should not come about through the expansion of Piedmont be-
cause that would only undermine local liberties and lead to excessive 
centralization: “…No lover of Italy could endure to see Milan, and 
Venice, and Florence, and the Eternal City itself sink into provincial 
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dependencies of the Savoyard.”  And yet this was exactly what had 31
happened. Even after unification was complete, Freeman continued to 
urge that Italy should pursue federal policies in order to avoid becom-
ing centralized along French lines: “…It is not too late to say that the 
true policy of the Italian Kingdom will be to approach as near to the 
Federal type as a Consolidated state can approach. It should keep as far 
as possible from the deadening system of French centralization; it 
should give every province, every city, every district, the greatest 
amount of local independence consistent with the common national 
action of the whole realm. Naples and Florence and Milan must not be 
allowed for a moment to feel themselves in bondage to an upstart rival 
like Turin. It is only by establishing perfect equality, and therefore per-
fect local independence, through every corner of his realm that the 
King of Piedmont can grow into a true King of Italy….”  32
 Greece was another troubled region that Freeman thought would 
have benefited from federal government. Late in life he described him-
self as a philhellene of fifty years, and throughout his career he was as 
passionate for the liberation of Greece as he was for the unification of 
Italy.  But Greece had its problems as well: critics frequently accused 33
the state of being one of the worst governed in Europe. Freeman admit-
ted the charge, but placed much of the blame for this condition on in-
terference by the great powers. Had Greece been left alone, he claimed, 
it would have developed into a federation: “Now all history tells me 
that a people winning its independence naturally adopts as its constitu-
tion the form of a Federal Republic. Instances two thousand years apart 
from each other all preach the same lesson. Achaia, Switzerland, Hol-
land, America, all followed the same invariable impulse.” Conditions in 
Greece, he continued, were conducive to federation:  The country con-
tained many geographically isolated communities that called out for 
local independence. The Ottomans had allowed the Greeks to retain 
“rude forms of municipality and self-government,” which could have 
provided the basis for a federal arrangement. A federal government 
Freeman and Victorian Federalism  15
would have accommodated the many minorities that fell within the 
borders of Greece: Albanians, Turks, Slavs, Wallachs, Jews. But instead 
of allowing Greece to develop in a federal direction, the great powers 
imposed a Bavarian monarchy which ignored these strong tendencies 
toward federation and established a centralized bureaucracy. A monar-
chy may have been necessary, but if Greece were to be governed well it 
should have been a monarchy that would have restored as much federal 
freedom as was consistent with a strong central authority.   34
 But Freeman was thinking about the Balkans in general more than 
about Italy or Greece. His interest in federal government had coalesced 
around the time of the Crimean War, as the Russian advance into Wal-
lachia and Moldavia, which forced the Ottomans to withdraw from the 
two principalities, raised the possibility of a new political arrangement 
in southeastern Europe. Freeman had always disliked the Ottomans: 
they were oppressors, the traditional enemy of Christian civilization, an 
Asian power encamped on European soil that would never assimilate to 
the West and therefore ought to go.  In 1855, as the war drew to a 35
close, he delivered a set of lectures on the History and Conquests of the 
Saracens that provided a historical justification for their removal. For 
Freeman, East and West had precise geographical boundaries. All lands 
that had fallen under the sway of either the Roman or Byzantine em-
pires he considered European: their inhabitants had been Christian, had 
participated in Greco-Roman civilization, had at one time spoken ei-
ther Greek or Latin, and had adhered to western political principles 
such as the rule of law. But the advance of Islam had eroded the edges 
of this European civilization. The Moorish conquest of Spain and the 
Ottoman conquest of the Balkans were phases of a single movement 
that had taken from Europe lands that were rightfully its own. The 
burden of history, as Freeman felt it, was to reclaim Europe for itself 
and for Christianity. The ejection of the Moors from Spain had started 
the process and the liberation of the Balkans must now complete it.  36
The question was how to accomplish this feat, and here federalism sup-
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plied the answer. Just as the Achaean League had united the Greeks and 
given them the strength to defeat the Macedonians, so a Balkan federa-
tion would provide the nations of southeastern Europe with the means 
to achieve their liberation. Searching for the common ground on which 
to build the federation, Freeman pointed to history and religion. It 
would be a federation of monarchies—Balkan political traditions were 
not republican—united by Orthodox Christianity, a common sense of 
having suffered for centuries at the hands of the Ottomans, and a rever-
ence for the Byzantine Empire.  37
 As this appreciation of Europe’s Byzantine past suggests, Freeman’s 
History of Federal Government was a very philhellenic work. It told the 
story of a heroic moment in Greek history, an early attempt to forge a 
Greek nation. It located the origin of the federal idea in the Greek past, 
appealed to the robust democracy of the Greek city-state as a remedy 
against excessive centralization, and pointed to the achievements of the 
Achaean League in order to demonstrate the value of federations for 
nation-building. As such it was a effective example of political rhetoric, 
making its case by appealing to ancient Greece, a civilization that en-
joyed a privileged position in Victorian culture. The History of Federal 
Government was also a book with a purpose, as Freeman applied his 
federal thinking to those parts of Europe where the emergence of na-
tionalism was making itself felt. He believed that Italy and Greece 
would have benefited from federal organization, and he urged the cre-
ation of a Balkan federation, hoping it would restore Europe by rescu-
ing the region from Ottoman domination. 
3 
 Freeman never completed the History of Federal Government. The 
final three volumes languished, un-researched and unwritten. But his 
interest in federalism persisted all the same. He welcomed the forma-
tion of a unified Germany, seeing it as an interesting example of a fed-
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eration of monarchies, and when the Eastern Question erupted in vio-
lence in the 1870s, he once again thought of applying the federal model 
to the Balkans.  But when spokesmen for Irish home rule and imperial 38
federation turned federalism into a domestic issue, he was less than en-
thusiastic. It was only natural that Freeman, an advocate of the rights of 
nationality in other parts of Europe, would be drawn to embrace home 
rule for Ireland, especially after Gladstone took up the cause.  He also 39
saw the attraction of creating stronger ties between Britain and its Eng-
lish-speaking colonies, including its former possession, the United 
States.  But no matter how sympathetic he was to the cause of home 40
rule, no matter how strong his desire to unite the Anglophone world, 
he seriously doubted whether the constitutional relationship between 
either Great Britain and Ireland or Great Britain and its colonies could 
be established successfully on a federal basis. Federations, he argued, 
repeating what he had already said in his History of Federal Government, 
were only suitable in certain circumstances. Whereas they had a role to 
play whenever a number of small states were amalgamating into a larger 
one, they were unlikely to work when a large state was breaking apart. 
This had been the lesson of history—“that the Federal relation is in its 
place when it tries to unite and not when it tries to disunite” —and he 41
pointed to the formation of the Swiss and American federations as ex-
amples. In both cases, he noted, federalism had initiated a process of 
amalgamation that over time would probably result in consolidated 
states.  42
 Freeman then applied this lesson to home rule. A truly federal solu-
tion to the Irish problem would require Britain and Ireland each to sur-
render a degree of sovereignty to a federal government that would then 
preside over their common affairs. A more thorough federalism would 
go even further: it would call for the establishment of Ireland, England, 
Scotland and Wales as autonomous states, which would then surrender 
sovereignty to a federal parliament. But for Freeman such a solution 
was unrealistic because it would reverse the direction toward greater 
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consolidation in which federations historically proceeded.  The fact 43
was, he concluded, Ireland was a British dependency, and the only prac-
tical way for it to achieve home rule would be for Britain to delegate it 
certain sovereign powers. Such a procedure would grant Ireland greater 
autonomy, but the relationship between the two countries would not be 
federal since Ireland would remain a dependency.  A federal arrange44 -
ment for the empire was equally unworkable, and for similar reasons. 
The colonies, he observed, like Ireland, were dependencies. For Britain 
to share sovereignty with them in a federation would require Britain to 
relinquish certain powers, most importantly control over foreign affairs, 
to a federal government. It was one thing for a number of small states 
to do this because in the long run they would gain from the added 
strength that federation would bring. But for a large, consolidated state 
like Britain to lose its independence by sharing sovereignty with its de-
pendencies was historically unprecedented: “The proposal that a ruling 
state … should come down from its position of empire, and enter into 
terms of equal confederation with its subject communities, is a very 
remarkable proposal, and one which perhaps never before had been 
made in the history of the world.”  45
 Freeman’s reluctance to extend federal ties to Ireland or the empire 
underscores the limitations of his federalist thinking, especially in its 
practical application. A reading of the History of Federal Government 
leaves the unmistakable impression that he admired federations most of 
all because of their military potential, their ability to bring fragmented 
regions together in a concerted effort to throw off a common oppressor. 
His book’s projected volumes, had he written them, would have all told 
stories of national liberation: the Dutch and Swiss defending themselves 
against Habsburg power, the American colonies battling for indepen-
dence. Freeman was preoccupied with nation-building, with organizing 
Europe into large states that would bring peace and stability to the con-
tinent while extending its frontiers. The thought of using federations to 
create still larger entities out of the fully-formed states of Europe was 
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more ambitious than he ever intended. Even the federation’s professed 
ability to promote liberal government took second place to its military 
capabilities. A suspicion of centralized authority may have troubled Vic-
torian liberals, especially as the French Second Empire came to embody 
their worst fears. But it is hard to comprehend how a federation of 
Balkan monarchies would have extended the political benefits of the 
small New England town to that troubled region. Far easier to see how 
it would have united the Balkan nations in an offensive league aimed at 
putting an end to Ottoman domination. 
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